Although not widely known until much later, Al Gore received 202 more votes than George W. Bush on election day in Florida. George W. Bush is president because he overcame his election day deficit with overseas absentee ballots that arrived and were counted after election day. In the final official tally, Bush received 537 more votes than Gore. These numbers are taken from the official results released by the Florida Secretary of State's office and so do not reflect overvotes, undervotes, unsuccessful litigation, butterfly ballot problems, recounts that might have been allowed but were not, or any other hypothetical divergence between voter preferences and counted votes. After the election, The New York Times conducted a six month investigation and found that 680 of the overseas absentee ballots were illegally counted, and almost no one has publicly disagreed with their assessment. In this paper, we describe the statistical procedures we developed and implemented for the Times to ascertain whether disqualifying these 680 ballots would have changed the outcome of the election. We present a variety of new empirical results that delineate the precise conditions under which Al Gore would have been elected president, and offer new evidence of the striking effectiveness of the Republican effort to prevent local election officials from applying election law equally to all Florida citizens.
Natta, Jr., 2001) and our methods were briefly described in a sidebar (Barbanel, 2001) . In this paper, we discuss in detail the methods we developed for this project so that others might use them for similar problems. The situation calls for ecological inference: We observe the number of bad ballots in each of Florida's counties and the number of ballots cast and counted for each of the candidates. From these variables, and a variety of other auxiliary information, we try to infer the total number of bad ballots that had been cast for each candidate and see whether this is enough to make up for Bush's official 537 vote margin.
Since the partisan atmosphere surrounding public discourse on this issue was so highly charged, we knew that our work would be subject to more than the usual academic scrutiny, and so we sought out methods that were less vulnerable to partisan criticism. We therefore used three separate approaches -inference with no statistical assumptions, with a succession of single models that any partisan might have considered, and finally with Bayesian model averaging that enable us to average over all of these single models with weights being their relative probability of being correct, as indicated by the data. So that others can use the methods we introduce here to analyze other problems, we have included all methods introduced here in the program
EI: A Program for Ecological Inference.
We estimate the probability that Gore would have won the election if the law had been followed in this instance. This probability is small, but we show that with mathematical certainty it is greater than zero.
Secondly, although our results suggest that it is unlikely that illegal overseas absentee ballots alone changed the election outcome, we show that Bush's margin of victory would likely have been much narrower if those flawed ballots had not been counted. This supports the argument made by The Times that the flawed ballots favored Bush much more than Gore. We also present a variety of results that did not appear in The Times article, including the probability that Gore would have won under various hypothetical scenarios, such as if Katherine Harris had accepted Palm Beach county's recount, which was submitted two hours late. In some plausible scenarios, the probability that Gore would have won is nearly 100%. Finally, and perhaps most interesting, we present evidence that the propensity of local election officials to violate the law and accept bad ballots was substantially greater in counties where Bush strategists believed there were more absentee ballot support for Bush and tried to convince election officials to accept bad ballots. This is consistent with
The Times' thesis and evidence that these local election officials bent to the will of Republican lobbyists.
Invalid Overseas Absentee Ballots in Florida
On July 15, 2001, The New York Times published an article, "How Bush Took Florida: Mining the Overseas Absentee Vote," as the result of its six-month investigation on the 2000 election. The Times reporters describe the details of the Bush campaign effort to secure victory by pressuring selected local election officials to count invalid overseas absentee ballots in Florida. In particular, Republicans focused on military ballots and the counties where Bush had his strongest voting base. For example, in counties such as Escambia and Santa Rosa, Bush lawyers argued that every vote cast by Americans in uniform should be counted, regardless of the letter of the law. In Democratic counties, Bush's lawyers argued exactly the opposite -that local election officials must follow the letter of the law and disqualify any ballot not meeting the rules.
According to The Times, this unequal pressure led to unequal treatment by local officials of overseas voters. That partisans would pursue their interests creatively, relentlessly, and even inconsistently in different places is neither a novel claim nor remotely illegal. That local election officials would respond to this pressure by treating voters unequally is a more serious claim. The Times' view -"The result was unequal treatment of ballots with the same flaws" -contradicts statements by Florida Secretary of State, Katherine
Harris, that the rules were applied uniformly. It also would seem to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which was part of the stated grounds under which the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore stopped the manual recounts.
The 680 ballots that The Times judged as flawed fell into one or more of these categories (Barstow and Van Natta, Jr., 2001 ): 3 344 ballots had late, illegible or missing postmarks (postmarks must indicate that the ballot was cast on or before election day); 4 183 ballots with United States postmarks (overseas absentee ballots must bear foreign postmarks); 169 ballots were received from voters who were not registered, who had failed to sign the envelope, or who had not requested a ballot; 96 ballots lacked the required signature or address of a witness; 19 voters cast two ballots, both of which counted; 5 ballots were received after the Nov. 17 deadline but counted anyway. If we knew for which candidate the illegal ballots were cast, we would immediately know their effect on the election. However, the secret ballot makes this impossible in most cases. The secret ballot was implemented in this case by separating the envelope, with all the information above, from the ballot contained inside the envelope once the latter was counted. Thus, we only have access to these envelopes, the county in which they were counted, and county-level data on the number of bad ballots and the number of ballots cast for Gore and Bush. Table 2 illustrates the estimation problem at the state level. The question mark indicates the unknown quantities to be estimated. The table illustrates that while we know the aggregate number of invalid and valid ballots as well as the total number of votes each candidate obtained from overseas absentee voters, we do not know their composition, which is the goal of the analysis. Analogous contingency tables also exist for each of the 67 Florida counties, and the same ecological inference problem exists in each. We also received three other kinds of data for each county. First, from voter registration records, we have data about each overseas absentee voter, including their sex, race, party registration, and whether they were military personnel or civilian. Second, for comparative purposes we also have data available for election-day voters in the 67 counties. Finally, The Times also provided us indicator variables for four regions in Florida and are used for the estimation, our ultimate quantity of interest is Bush's margin after dropping the invalid absentee ballots. To define this quantity, first define the statewide fraction of bad ballots that went to Gore β bad as the weighted average of the individual county quantities. 6 Thus,
Ecological Inference for Flawed Ballots
Once we estimate this quantity, we can also estimate the probability of Gore's victory, Pr(Bush's margin < 0), which is the main quantity of interest. 7
Analysis Without Statistical Assumptions
The the parameters in Table 3 follow an accounting identity
5 Although our presentation always involves only the Bush/Gore choice, our empirical results using deterministic bounds in Section 3.1 includes the possibility of bad ballots having been cast for minor party candidates. We handle minor parties in our statistical analyses by ignoring the problem at first and then conducting sensitivity analyses in Appendix B; since votes for minor party candidates only total 3 percent, we find, as expected, that they have a very small effect on the overall result. Other analyses (not shown) using more computationally intensive techniques designed to model these choices separately confirm these results (see Rosen et al., 2001) . 6 The weighted average is
is not used in Equation 1 but is necessary as an ancillary parameter during estimation. which is generated by the aggregation process, and therefore always holds exactly with no stochastic term.
It also implies a deterministic linear relationship between the two unknown parameters (Duncan and Davis, 1953) ,
which traces out what King (1997) The most significant conclusion from this analysis is that we cannot exclude the possibility that Gore actually won the election. That is, without making any assumptions other than that The Times coding decisions were correct (and again, we saw no objection to them in the media discussion that followed their story), the 537 Bush margin now changes to somewhere from a 126 vote victory for Gore to a 936 vote victory for Bush. Once the ballots were removed from the envelopes, America forever gave up the possibility of knowing for certain who won the most votes in the 2000 election.
Statistical Analysis with a Single Model Specification
The lack of any statistical assumptions puts the analysis in Section 3.1 on extremely firm footing. In fact, measurement error aside, the conclusions there contain no inferential uncertainties at all, which is of course quite unusual for social science research. If the resulting bounds excluded the possibility of one candidate winning, our analysis would end right here. Unfortunately, all we know from the bounds is that there exists a possibility that either Gore or Bush received more votes. Indeed, even if all but a tiny piece of the bounded interval reflected a Bush (or a Gore) victory, it would provide no information about the probability that a particular candidate won other than that zero is excluded (since the bounds alone do not imply any probability distribution over the interval). Since this probability was the quantity of interested for our project, the Times needed us to go further than the bounds and to make an inference about the probability that about 90% of the bad ballots went to Bush, which if corrected would have produced a Gore victory. For that quantity, the bounds alone are in sufficient.
In order to learn more about who actually won the election -the likely margins of victory within the deterministic bounds -the only option is to add some statistical assumptions. With these assumptions, we can make probabilistic statements about our quantities of interest. The problem with any model-based statistical analysis, of course, is that there might be a disagreement about the assumptions to be made, and so the price of the more precise conclusions that follow is the additional uncertainty due to model specification.
This is a common problem in social science research, but it is particularly salient when attempting to provide independent nonpartisan advice in the midst of one of the most highly charged partisan debates in modern times. Our approach to this problem is to formally incorporate uncertainty due to model specification into our final estimate.
We use the class of ecological inference models given in King (1997) , which has come to called EI after the software that implements them. To begin, we summarize graphically the bounds obtained in Section 3.1. All of the above is as far as it is possible to go without making statistical assumptions. Next, we add three assumptions, all conditional on X and a specified set of control variables Z. We could begin with the assumption that β bad i and β good i are the same for all counties, which is essentially Goodman's regression.
This would be enough to identify the model, but it would be a very strong assumption, and indeed in our application it can be rejected with certainty by merely examining Figure 1 .
Thus, instead of assuming that β bad i and β good i are the same over counties, we assume that they come from the same distribution (the truncated bivariate normal distribution, with truncation kept to the square in the figure) . The idea is that whatever the values of the unknown parameters from Florida's 67 counties on their respective tomography lines, they all have something in common -since they are all in the same state, subject to almost the same electoral campaign, etc. Differences of any size across the counties in these parameters are thus allowed so long as they are either random and fit the distributional assumption or they are systematic and taken into account by control variables. The main constraints added by this assumption is that the bivariate density is unimodal (which is the formalization of the assumption that the counties "have something in common") and that all volume under the density appears over the square represented by the tomography plot. Violations of this distributional assumption do not seem to affect the quantities we need for this application (see King, 1997: Table 9 .2).
The second assumption is that the absence of residual spatial correlation in T after taking into account X and Z. King's ecological inference model has been shown to be relatively insensitive to anything but extreme levels of spatial autocorrelation (King, 1997: Table 9 .1, King, 2000) , but we make this assumption even more plausible by including tests with covariates that tap into Florida's regions and other spatial features.
The final assumption states that the two unknown quantities, β bad i and β good i , are independent of X i , given Z. For example, if more bad ballots cast for Gore, β bad i , came from counties with more bad ballots overall, X i , then this assumption would be violated unless Z included variables that sufficiently controlled for this relationship. This is the most critical of the three assumptions, and so the validity of the analysis depends crucially on the content of Z. Each of these three assumptions can be modified or relaxed by the inclusion of different covariates, Z, and so the main model uncertainty that is assumed presently is Z.
Statistical Analyses that Acknowledge Model Uncertainty
Sensitivity to model specification in quantitative political science is perhaps most commonly seen when minor changes among the explanatory variables in regression-type analyses result in large differences in the estimates. The endemic nature of such model dependent inferences makes a decision to base inferences on a single model highly dubious in many situations. This is all the more so in ecological inference where model dependence is frequently an issue. Yet, almost all existing applications of ecological inference use a single specification. Indeed, few use any explanatory variables, Z, at all.
The partisan nature of the controversy in which we were providing advice makes the issue of model dependence especially salient, although it is not markedly different from other applications. We began by following the most common procedure of estimating many models (i.e., with different Z) and assessing the degree to which our ultimate quantities of interest depend on the specification. This was informative but insufficient, since our task was to provide a single inference with a point estimate and confidence interval.
Three basic ways of drawing a single inference in the presence of model uncertainty exist. Some researchers persist in choosing a single model, perhaps on the basis of qualitative arguments about its merits, and draw inferences assuming its veracity. This optimistic approach typically overestimates the degree to which the researcher is certain of the correct model specification, and hence typically gives biased estimates and overly narrow confidence intervals. Other researchers use a formal model selection criterion, such as stepwise regression, Mallow's Cp, and AIC, to pick the best model. Although these procedures are inappropriate when estimating causal effects, they are reasonable when the quantity of interest is predictive, such as ecological inference. Unfortunately, even in these situations the result of applying these criteria is one model, which also ignores model uncertainty.
An approach now widely recognized to be superior to standard model selection criterion is Bayesian model averaging, which we apply to our ecological inference problem. The basic idea is to estimate a large number of potential models and to take the weighted average of their results, with weights based on probability that a model is correct. The correctness of the model is not assumed ex ante; nor is it merely based on goodness of fit; it is instead calculated from the data via Bayesian analysis. The key result of Bayesian model averaging is that the resulting inferences (1) are more accurate than those produced by standard model selection criterion, (2) formally incorporate model uncertainty, and (3) outperform any of the individual models that are averaged over. The last property does not depend on whether the true model generating the data lies inside or outside models averaged over. That is, inferences from Bayesian model averaging always outperforms any individual model considered (e.g., Madigan and Raftery, 1994) . 9 Model 9 This result is similar to insights from the closely related literature on committee methods (Bishop, 1995) , although surprisingly averaging thus allows one to consider a wide range of models, while still producing one set of results.
Of course, one can never cover the entire model space, which is normally of infinite size, since Bayesian model averaging only allows one to include a finite number of models. Therefore, the resulting inferences can always be improved by adding additional models, no matter how many models have already been included. This is not a unique feature of Bayesian model averaging since it is always possible to come up with a better model for any statistical analysis where the correct model is unknown to researchers. However, Bayesian model averaging offers a significant improvement over the usual approach of basing inferences on one assumed model, no matter how that model is chosen.
Bayesian model averaging is especially important in our application since political scientists have rarely studied absentee ballots and we therefore have little prior theory with which to assist in model specification.
The procedure thus enables us to conduct an analysis without having to defend one particular specification, or even a small set of specifications. We came up with our list of models by talking in detail to reporters and partisans on both sides. We then formalized every intuition any of them mentioned in an ecological inference model (by defining Z) and included every one in our analysis. We also added several other models we came up with independently.
Our search for models identified 31 possibilities for Z, including including race, sex, and party registration for the overseas absentee voters as well as models based on 24 county level election and demographic variables. We also include a model with no covariates and 3 models with X i as the covariate for the mean of β bad , β good , and for both. 10 Each of our models includes at most two covariates. In part this is because no one including journalists and academics proposed a model that clearly was defined by more. But more importantly, we know that better predictions can be obtained when not overfitting the data with many covariates. Hoeting et al. (1999) and Madigan and Raftery (1994) and many others have shown that Bayesian model averaging almost never puts much weight on such models, and predictive inferences (unlike some the literatures have relatively few cross-citations. See also Rosen, Jiang, and Tanner (2000) and Robert (1996) . See Hoeting et al. (1999) for a general introduction to Bayesian model averaging. Raftery and Zheng (2003) derive the optimality of its longrun performance. See Bartels (1997) , Bartels and Zaller (2001) (24) proportion of voting age population not registered, (25) Black registered Democrats, (26) Black registered Republican residents, (27) acceptance ratio of overall absentee ballots, (28) ratio of invalid absentee ballots, (29) Panhandle Florida regional indicator variable, (30) Southern Florida regional indicator variable, (31) corruption indicator. All the covariates except indicator variables are entered as a ratio varying from 0 to 1. Except the first three models, the covariate was used to model the conditional untruncated mean of both parameters, β bad and β good . Models (5) to (11) are based on information about the absentee ballots and so different variables were available regarding the invalid and valid ballots; we used the former group to predict β bad and the latter to predict β good . We reran each model with different starting values to verify that we found the global maximum. We also examined each of the tomography plots with confidence regions to search for outliers or bad model fits. In addition, we plotted E(T |X) or E(T |X, Z) by X or Z, and checked whether the observed T fell within the (say) 90% confidence interval 90% of the time.
causal inferences) are typically better with parsimonious specifications. 11
Although we know of no application of ecological inference that uses more than a single explanatory variable (and almost all applications use none), we also tried expanding our setup from 0, 1, and 2 variable models to also include several 3 and 4 variable specifications. Although some of these highly computationally intensive models had large enough estimated weights to be meaningful, including these in the Bayesian model averaging procedure did not appreciably change our substantive estimates. Of course, we have also omitted an infinite number of other possible models from the set we average over, and it is possible that future researchers will find and include a model we excluded that would change our empirical conclusions.
For example, we exclude all models with more than four explanatory variables, as well as all interactions and all models based on data we do not have. Our Bayesian model averaging results are known to be better than any individual model among those we average over, but our results could be overturned if someone finds a plausible model to add that turns out to have a high probability of being correct and leads to different inferences. Figure 2 portrays the posterior distribution from our analysis of Bush's margin of victory if the bad ballots had not been counted (the histogram of 1000 draws from the posterior). Note first that, as required by the procedure, all area for this distribution is contained within the bounds we found for this quantity of −126 to 936. The weight of the statistical evidence within these bounds clearly demonstrates that Bush benefited considerably by the bad ballots, and removing them thus takes away from his margin. This is evident in the figure because almost all of the area of the histogram of posterior probability falls to the left of the official margin of 537. The mean margin of victory for Bush without the bad ballots is only 251 votes. The figure also portrays the probability that Gore actually won the election by the area under the curve to the left of zero. This is only about 0.2 percent, indicating that Gore probably would not have won, even if the bad ballots had been discarded.
Empirical Results

The Probability That Gore Would Have Won Without Bad Absentee Ballots
Other Counterfactuals
While our results indicate that it is unlikely that invalid overseas absentee ballots alone would have changed the election outcome, the illegally counted ballots could have had a much more a significant effect when combined with slight changes in decisions regarding the manual recounts. We show this result by first focusing on several scenarios about the two key counties where a manual recount was conducted, Miami Dade and Palm Beach. In Miami Dade county, election officials decided to stop the manual recount when 11 Multiple covariates uncorrelated with X i causes no identification problems in EI. Ecological inference models that do not incorporate information from the deterministic bounds (such as in Goodman, 1953) are not identified when including Xi or variables related to X i (King, 1997: 42) . Thus, to the extent that models that incorporate the bounds, such as EI, are estimable when including X i or covariates that are related to X i , the information that makes this possible is coming from the bounds. Predictions about the quantities of inferences in EI are not often greatly affected by including more than one covariate at a time. Beach county, they also could not finish the manual recount, but they submitted the result of the partial recount just before the deadline, which would have given Gore a net gain of 192 votes for Gore. Later that day, Palm Beach electoral officials reported the result of the complete recount to Katherine Harris. She rejected this complete recount as well as the partial recount and did not include them in the certified official tally, thereby denying Gore a total of 349 votes (Purdum, 2000) .
The panel of Table 5 marked "actual recounts" presents our prediction for Bush's margin and Gore's probability of victory in situations where the invalid overseas absentee ballots had been rejected and the recounts in one or both of these counties had been included in the final tally. For example, if the recounted votes in Miami Dade and Palm Beach had all been counted, Gore would have won with a 0.82 probability, with the uncertainty in this number coming only from our analysis of the bad overseas absentee ballots. If only the Palm Beach votes had been counted, Gore would have won with 0.29 probability. To put it one way, the massive differences in the probabilities from 0.002 to 0.82 for a Gore victory were all due to the decisions of Katherine Harris. Of course, these decisions could have been overturned by the courts, and the candidates could have influenced them if they had requested statewide or different types of recounts.
In the last panel of Table 5 , we consider counterfactuals where the invalid overseas absentee ballots had not been counted and election day voting recounts had occurred in various ways, as suggested by a study conducted by a consortium of media organizations (Fessenden and Broder, 2001 probability. If the entire state had been recounted, according to almost any standard for judging the punch cards, Gore would have won election with a very high probability.
Indirect Evidence of Local Election Officials Responding to Republican Pressure
Six months of interviews and archival research on the ground in Florida and elsewhere led reporters from
The New York Times to conclude that, "the Republicans mounted a legal and public relations campaign to persuade canvassing boards in Bush strongholds to waive the state's election laws when counting overseas absentee ballots.. . . Their goal was simple: to count the maximum number of overseas ballots in counties won by Mr. Bush, particularly those with a high concentration of military voters, while seeking to disqualify overseas ballots in counties won by Vice President Al Gore." The Times claimed that as a direct result of this pressure, "canvassing boards in about a dozen Republican-leaning counties had reconvened for a second round of counting. In each place, longstanding election rules were bent and even ignored. Boards counted ballots postmarked as many as seven days after the election, including some from within the United States.
They counted two ballots sent by fax. Officials in Santa Rosa county even counted five ballots that arrived after the Nov. 17 deadline. Again and again, election officials crossed out the words 'REJECTED AS ILLEGAL' that had been stamped on ballot envelopes."
If these claims are correct, we ought to be able to find evidence of them in our data. We conduct two tests.
In the first, we divide Florida's counties into three categories -the six counties mentioned explicitly in The Times story where the Republicans pressured officials to count illegal ballots, the four counties mentioned where Republicans pressured local election officials not to count the ballots, and the remaining counties which were not mentioned. We then compute various statistics for these three categories and present them for comparison in Table 6 . (The results in this table were not available to the reporters before their article appeared and so Table 6 does represent an independent test.)
The evidence strikingly supports The Times' account of events. The first two columns of Table 6 report on the characteristics of the county, information available to Republican strategists before they started lobbying. With the exception of two counties with very few absentee ballots, the counties identified as areas where the Republicans focused their efforts to count ballots were those with large populations of military personnel and Republican voters. Similarly, the counties The Times identified as places where Republicans discouraged the ballots from being counted had consistently fewer military personnel and Republican voters.
The result of the Republican efforts also appears to have been successful. A larger fraction of bad ballots were counted in all counties where Republicans tried to get them counted than the average, and a smaller fraction than the average were counted in every county where the Republicans tried to have them not counted. The fraction of bad ballots accepted that had been cast for Bush also supports the same theory:
Fewer of the counted bad ballots had been Bush voters when the Republicans tried not to have ballots counted than in every county where the Republicans tried to have them counted.
The Times' report also helps explain some interesting variations in this We also look for indirect evidence of local election officials succumbing to pressure from Republican Party officials by examining the posterior probabilities of each of the 31 component models we included.
Generally, if
The Times' hypothesis is right, we would expect that the covariates that have the biggest effects would be related to where Republicans tried hardest to influence local officials. If they were as rational and deliberate as The Times suggested, these would be counties where they expected the largest numbers of bad ballots that, if counted, would help Bush's cause. Obviously, we have no such variable, but we do have a variety of variables related to this. Table 7 gives the top six models listed in order of the posterior probability of being correct. In the top six, two have the largest effects and both are consistent with the theory: The more absentee voters registered as Republicans, and the more white absentee voters in a district, the more bad ballots were cast for Bush (the negative sign indicating that Bush's lead is reduced when these ballots are not counted). The other covariates have comparatively small effects.
The large variation in our prediction for Bush's margin across the six models in Table 7 emphasizes a clear advantage of our Bayesian model averaging procedure. The variation results from the large degree of model dependence in these data (because the data have fairly wide bounds). For example, the specification with white absentee voters gives a confidence interval which, when considered in isolation from the other models, would not enable us to reject the hypothesis that Gore won if only the overseas absentee ballots had been rejected. This is obviously quite different from our overall result of only a 0.2 percent probability that Gore won. Since different specifications yield very different inferences, an analyst having to choose one model would be in the untenable position of having to defend choices without a lot of prior evidence.
Bayesian model averaging offers a way around this common problem. Instead of results jumping dramatically from one specification to the next, inferences resulting from Bayesian model averaging do not change as much when new models are added to the specification, unless they have especially large probabilities of being true. Of course, we cannot get something for nothing. Our procedure is an improvement over straight EI because we only need to assume that one of our 31 models, or some combination of our 31 models, contains something close to the right model. This is in contrast to the usual approach where we merely get one model from which to choose, but it is not a panacea: although if someone comes up with a new idea for a model, we can include it, but if none or no combination of those we consult comes close to the right model, then our procedure will obviously fail to give valid answers.
Concluding Remarks
Counterfactual analysis is normally difficult, and especially so when the subject of the inference is far from the factual evidence. When the counterfactual is very close to the data, however, we stand an especially good chance of making valid inferences (King and Zeng, 2001; Lebow, 2000) . The counterfactuals in the case of Florida are especially clear and could have happened easily, which makes the results of this case study somewhat more certain than usual. If the problem of the overseas absentee ballots had been litigated and the law applied equally in every county (as Bush v. Gore required of the votes cast on election day), the bad ballots might very well have been disqualified. In this situation, although Gore probably would have lost, we conclude that no one will ever be able to say with certainty who would have won the American presidential election if all American laws had been followed. Also, if the Florida Secretary of State had different views on issues that were at least somewhat open to discretion, the outcome of the election might very well have changed. Of course, a few different decisions by the candidates on visits to Florida, campaign spending, Elian Gonzalos, or any of a variety of other issues might also have produced a different outcome. Our results also provide indirect, but strong and independent support for the thesis that local election officials bent to the persuasive efforts of Republican strategists to follow the law in Gore counties and break it in Bush areas.
Finally, we think this paper also provides an especially good example of the use of Bayesian model averaging. We have developed the application of it to the ecological inference model and offer computer code for others to use it. Bayesian model averaging is a clear improvement on the usual situation of having to select and defend a single model, but it is of course not a panacea. A researcher never knows whether all relevant models have been included and, although its results are more robust than single-model approaches, it is always possible to come up with a different list of models and produce a different result. And so in the end, and as always, the investigator's judgment always plays an important role in making inferences.
Model averaging cannot substitute for judgment, but it can help account for model uncertainties where prior knowledge is not available. Furthermore, in the present case, where 100% confidence intervals are available (in the form of bounds on the parameters), we also have additional constraints on possible results.
A Technical Issues in Modeling and Estimation
From one application of one specification of this model, we compute the posterior density of a quantity of interest ∆ by drawing it from its posterior, conditional on the model P(∆|M k , T ). To do this, we draw simulations of β bad and β good from their posterior and calculate simulations of ∆. Bayes theorem specifies that the posterior is proportional to the product of the prior times the likelihood, P(Θ|T ) ∝ P(Θ)P(T |Θ),
where P(Θ) is the prior probability distribution on some unknown parameter Θ, and P(T |Θ) is the likelihood. Everything is conditioned on X, N , and Z, which we observe. We use the standard independent prior on each parameter of Θ as described in King (1997) . This prior distribution and the likelihood function together define King's model in a standard Bayesian framework.
Let M k denote the kth model specification (k = 1, . . . , 31). Then we make an inference about a quantity of interest ∆ by computing its posterior distribution via Bayesian model averaging. To do this, we first compute, for each model, the posterior distribution of ∆ (computed from the posterior with ∆ being some known function of Θ): P(∆|M k , T ). Then we average over these models by weighting by the relative posterior probability that each model is correct given the data, Pr(M k |T ): Pr(∆|T ) =
where the posterior model probability is Pr(
. This is the probability that model k is correct, given the set of models in the analysis; it should not be confused with R 2 -like measures which typically reward models that over-fit without distinguishing systematic from idiosyncratic features of the data.
To compute the posterior model probability, we need two elements. First is a prior probability that each model is correct, Pr(M k ), which we set to uniform. The other is the marginal likelihood, P(T |M k ), which is obtained by averaging the likelihood over the prior distribution. 12 The marginal likelihood is "the probability of seeing the data that actually were observed, calculated before any data became available" (Kass and Raftery, 1995, p.776) . That is, instead of maximizing the likelihood with respect to the parameter given the data, as we would do to compute the maximum likelihood estimate, the marginal likelihood does not have a maximization step: it is the average value of the likelihood evaluated at parameter values drawn from their prior density. (Although this quantity could be computed by simulation in this way, such a method tends to be highly inefficient, especially for problems with relatively flat priors or high dimensional parameter vectors.)
To compute the marginal likelihood, we use the Laplace approximation, which is known to perform well 12 The marginal likelihood is P(T |M k ) = R P(T |Θ k , M k )P(Θ k |M k )dΘ k , where P(Θj|Mj) is the prior distribution for the parameter vector Θ in Model k. compared with other methods (Raftery, 1996; Lewis and Raftery, 1997; DiCiccio et al., 1997) . 13 Its rate of approximation is O(n −1 ), which is considerably better than easier-to-apply methods such as Bayesian information criteria (BIC), which has a rate of only O(n −1/2 ) (Kass, Tierney and Kadane, 1989) . For example, Kass and Raftery (1995: 778) say that "even for very large samples, it [BIC] does not produce the correct value." Hence, in our application the Laplace approximation is more appropriate than BIC.
B The Minor Effects of Minor Candidates and Prior Densities
Here, we analyze the effects on our results of ignoring the minor party candidates and also study the sensitivity of our results to our choices for model priors. 
